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STATUTORY EROSION OF SECURED 
CREDITORS’ RIGHTS: SOME 
INSIGHTS FROM THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
Adrian J. Walters* 
As the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Commission to Study 
the Reform of Chapter 11 considers the state of business bankruptcy 
in this country, the narrative on chapter 11 is well-established and oft-
repeated. According to this narrative, whereas in the past firms filing 
for chapter 11 came into the bankruptcy process with at least some 
unencumbered assets, modern firms tend to have capital structures 
that are entirely consumed by multiple layers of secured debt. Moreo-
ver, as secured creditors have come to dominate capital structures, 
conventional wisdom has it that they have “captured” chapter 11 to 
the detriment of unsecured creditors. This development has justifiably 
troubled many scholars on both efficiency and distributional grounds. 
However, it remains an open question whether the perceived down-
sides of secured creditor control can be satisfactorily addressed 
through bankruptcy law reform. 
In this Article, Professor Walters examines English attempts to 
use bankruptcy law to adjust the priority and control rights of secured 
creditors with the aim of improving the welfare of unsecured credi-
tors. The Article starts from the premise that lenders that are powerful 
enough to bargain for superior control and priority rights inside or 
outside of bankruptcy will be equally capable of adjusting to legal 
changes that affect, or are perceived as affecting their interests. Four 
ways in which lenders will adjust to “adverse” bankruptcy reform are 
identified: (i) metabargaining; (ii) adjustments to prebankruptcy be-
havior; (iii) transactional innovation; and (iv) “shape shifting”. In 
Parts II and III, the Article then illustrates how English lenders have 
successfully adjusted to statutory erosion of their priority rights 
through transactional innovation and to statutory attempts to curb 
their control rights through “shape shifting”. Walters’ conclusion on 
the efficacy of bankruptcy law reform is cautionary and skeptical. He 
assesses English attempts to improve the position of unsecured credi-
tors by dampening the rights of secured creditors as a failed conceit. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 I think it’s fair to say that the way cases are financed and the way 
the Code treats secured creditors’ rights is something that we are 
looking at very carefully. And this is something that needs to be 
frankly looked at carefully and calibrated very carefully because one 
of the things that we constantly have to remember is that changes that 
we make to the Bankruptcy Code with respect to creditors’ rights, in-
cluding lenders’ rights, not only impact bankruptcy cases but have a 
ripple effect on the credit community as a whole. 
Robert J. Keach, cochair of the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Com-
mission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11.1 
This symposium is premised on a set of concerns about the capture 
of chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings by secured creditors, and a search 
for solutions to address these concerns. The American Bankruptcy Insti-
tute’s Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, which is expected 
to report and make recommendations for the reform of U.S. business re-
                                                                                                                                      
 *  Ralph L. Brill Professor of Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. My thanks to participants 
in the ABI-Illinois Symposium on Chapter 11 Reform and, in particular, to Steve Harris and Ted  
Janger. Thanks also to Scott Vanderlin for research assistance. Any errors are mine alone.  
 1. Examining Key Developments of ABI’s Chapter 11 Commission During 2013 and the Steps to 
the Final Report for 2014, AM. BANKR. INST. 26:16 (Dec. 9, 2013), available at http://bit.ly/1ebhBZz. 
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organization law by the end of 2014, has the issue of secured creditors’ 
rights squarely on its radar. The narrative is now well-established and 
oft-repeated. Whereas in the past, firms filing for chapter 11 would come 
into the bankruptcy process with at least some unencumbered assets, 
modern firms tend to have capital structures that are entirely consumed 
by multiple layers of secured debt. And so, according to the prevailing 
conventional wisdom, chapter 11, in the general run of cases, has become 
little more than a glorified nationwide foreclosure process through which 
secured creditors can exit via a quick section 363 sale or an outright liq-
uidation.2 
Some are strongly inclined to lament this development. Professor 
Tabb, for example, worries that the use of bankruptcy as a de facto fore-
closure mechanism distributes any going-concern value that the debtor’s 
assets may have to secured creditors, while cutting off the prospect that 
other constituents, such as trade creditors, could share in the downstream 
value of a firm reorganized along traditional lines.3 In their excellent arti-
cle, Professors Jacoby and Janger do not doubt that there are occasions 
when a swift “all-asset” sale will be the best value maximization choice 
available, but they also recognize the potential for secured creditors and 
purchasers to appropriate going-concern value for themselves and so de-
ny junior claimants the benefit of any increase in firm value that might 
accrue through a delayed sale or a reorganization.4 
Secured creditor control thus implicates both efficiency and distri-
butional concerns. Quick liquidating sales could be the wrong choice on 
both efficiency and distributional grounds. Or, even if they are the right 
wealth maximization choice in the aggregate, all-encompassing secured 
claims implicate the welfare of so-called nonadjusting (or weakly adjust-
ing) creditors who have no, or no sufficient, bargaining power to collat-
eralize their claims effectively ex ante. It follows that there are at least 
two kinds of concerns. First, a concern that secured creditor control may 
lead to inefficient and unfair outcomes because of an inbuilt bias towards 
quick sales in cases where a delayed sale or reorganization may prove the 
better choice for creditors collectively. This concern relates to the size of 
the “bankruptcy” pie. Second, a concern that security interests that are 
all-encompassing in scope tend to facilitate redistribution of wealth away 
                                                                                                                                      
 2. The literature is now extensive. For recent contributions see Chapter 11 at the Crossroads: 
Does Reorganization Need Reform?—A Symposium on the Past, Present and Future of U.S. Corporate 
Restructuring, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 365, 397–99 (2010); Charles J. Tabb, Credit Bidding, Secu-
rity, and the Obsolescence of Chapter 11, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 103; Charles J. Tabb, The Bankruptcy 
Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and the Limited Rights of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. 
L. REV.765 [hereinafter Tabb, The Bankruptcy Clause]. 
 3. Tabb, The Bankruptcy Clause, supra note 2, at Part IV. 
 4. Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 866–67 (2014). 
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from nonadjusting creditors.5 This concern relates, of course, to the ques-
tion of how the “bankruptcy” pie is divided. 
Even assuming we are persuaded that these concerns are norma-
tively and empirically well founded, there is to my mind a persistent 
question about whether they can be satisfactorily addressed through 
bankruptcy law reform. And, if so, what types of reform might work? 
Should we just make procedural adjustments designed to diminish the 
control rights of secured creditors in an attempt to ensure that the “im-
mediate sale versus delayed sale or reorganization” decision gets made in 
an aggregate value maximizing way?6 Or, if it is the sheer breadth of 
blanket security interests to which we object, can we really hope to redis-
tribute successfully in bankruptcy by, for example, carving out a portion 
of the senior claimants’ collateral to finance a meaningful payout to jun-
ior claimants? 
My contribution to this symposium is “different” insofar as I get to 
add an English twist. Otherwise, I make no great claims. The underlying 
theme of what I have to say is cautionary, skeptical, and mundane. My 
main point is a somewhat pessimistic variation on Bob Keach’s theme in 
my opening quote. Lenders that are powerful enough to bargain for su-
perior control and priority rights inside or outside of bankruptcy will in-
variably and inevitably adjust to legal changes that affect, or are per-
ceived as affecting, their interests.7 And so the risks from a reform 
standpoint are obvious. The more “adjustment proof” the reform pro-
posal, the greater the likelihood it will be resisted and diluted through 
the political process.8 Conversely, the more a reform proposal seeks to 
strike a fair “balance” among competing interests, the greater the likeli-
hood that it will be susceptible to adjustment, possibly even outright 
avoidance.9 
If we leave aside pricing (i.e., cost of credit) adjustments, there are 
at least four fairly obvious ways in which lenders will adjust to what they 
would characterize as “adverse” bankruptcy law reform. These are: 
1. Metabargaining. One does not have to be an expert in interest 
group theory to understand that if we want to influence the behav-
ior or affect the interests of a well-resourced and well-coordinated 
group through law reform, the group in question will seek to “bar-
                                                                                                                                      
 5. For a useful summary of the long running debate among scholars about the efficiency or oth-
erwise of secured credit, see Brian M. McCall, It’s Just Secured Credit! The Natural Law Case in De-
fense of Some Forms of Secured Credit, 43 IND. L. REV. 7, 9–16 (2009). 
 6. I say “just,” but the difficulties should not be underestimated. The imposition of procedural 
safeguards is far from cost free, and will tend to increase the scope for intercreditor conflict. See gener-
ally Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 511 (2009). 
 7. See BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERRENCE CHARLES HALLIDAY, RESCUING BUSINESS: THE 
MAKING OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW IN ENGLAND AND IN THE UNITED STATES 32–33 (1998). 
 8. Lender resistance to repeated Congressional attempts to allow debtors to modify home 
mortgages in Chapter 13 is a case in point. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Mortgage Modification, Equitable 
Subordination, and the Honest but Unfortunate Creditor, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1601–02 (2011). 
 9. See, e.g., John Armour, Legal Capital: An Outdated Concept? 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 5, 
26-27 (2006). 
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gain” through the political process to resist or dilute any changes 
that it regards as unwelcome.10 How the banking and secured-credit 
lobby exercises political power, how that power is configured, and 
how its scope, contours, and dimensions may have changed in the 
half decade since the global financial crisis, are matters that I do not 
have the space to get into here. Nevertheless, the point, which is es-
sentially a rudimentary point of political economy, bears repeti-
tion.11 
2. Adjustments to prebankruptcy behavior. If bankruptcy becomes 
less hospitable to secured creditors, we can expect them to exploit 
their bargaining and informational advantages to intervene sooner 
to protect their interests outside of bankruptcy.12 
3. Transactional innovation. Insofar as they are able, using the legal 
resources and technologies available to them, sophisticated actors 
will devise new contract terms and transactional structures to work 
around unwelcome rules.13 
4. Shape shifting. I use this as shorthand to try to capture a subtly 
different type of adjustment. Adjustments to prebankruptcy behav-
ior are upstream adjustments that take place outside of, but in the 
shadow of, the bankruptcy system.14 Transactional innovation in the 
main involves bargaining around inconvenient rules.15 By “shape 
shifting,” I mean that secured creditors are able to adapt over time 
so that old forms of functional control are asserted in new ways 
within the bankruptcy law framework even as that framework is 
changing.16 In the present context, the implication is that changes to 
bankruptcy law regimes designed to curb secured creditors’ power 
in the interests of other stakeholders may not work as intended.17 
Control may “change shape” within the interstices of a revised legal 
framework while functioning more or less in the same way. 
I will try to illustrate the phenomenon of lender adjustment by brief ref-
erence to two sets of developments—one affecting lender priority, the 
other affecting lender control—that have occurred in my home jurisdic-
tion of England and Wales.18 
In Part II, I consider the recent history of lender responses to Eng-
lish statutory “carve-out” provisions—that is, provisions of bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                                      
 10. See CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note 7, at 42–43. 
 11. On the phenomenon of metabargaining for favorable law in the Anglo-US bankruptcy law 
context, see id. at 15–44. 
 12. See Kara J. Bruce, Rehabilitating Bankruptcy Reform, 13 NEV. L.J. 174, 179–81 (2012). 
 13. See generally Daniel D. Prentice, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Enterprise Act 2002, 5 
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 153 (2004). 
 14. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 15. Prentice, supra note 13, at 154. 
 16. Id. at 154–58. 
 17. Id. 
 18. The title of my essay refers to the “United Kingdom.” The U.K. is a unitary state currently 
made up of three distinct “law districts:” England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Of the 
three, England and Wales is comfortably the largest by population. For ease and economy (and with 
no offence intended to the Welsh) I will use ‘English’ throughout as shorthand for “English and 
Welsh.” 
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law designed to carve out and redistribute a portion of lienholder collat-
eral to unsecured creditors. These attempts to erode lender priority have 
largely failed because of transactional innovation. Lenders have persis-
tently, and for the most part, successfully restructured and recharacter-
ized their lending transactions to avoid the ambit of a series of iterations 
of redistributive legislation. 
In Part III, I discuss how lenders have adjusted to statutory erosion 
of their control rights, notably the legislative abrogation in 2003 of a 
blanket lienholder’s right to foreclose on the entire business assets of a 
debtor through the appointment of a special kind of receiver known in 
English law as an administrative receiver. In the decade since that re-
form, I suggest that secured creditor control has simply been reconfig-
ured within the interstices of a revised bankruptcy law framework that 
Parliament intended to be a panacea for the perceived ills of administra-
tive receivership. This process of adjustment is an example of functional 
substitution through “shape shifting” facilitated in considerable degree 
by features of the law that can be attributed to metabargaining. The end 
result is that old concerns about the harmful aspects of administrative re-
ceivership have been replaced by new, but strikingly similar, concerns 
about the implications of secured creditor control for the plight of unse-
cured creditors. 
II. STATUTORY CARVE-OUTS FROM FLOATING CHARGE COLLATERAL 
A. The Fixed and Floating Charge: A Brief History 
In English secured transactions law, the main species of consensual 
nonpossessory security interest is the charge. There are, as is well known, 
two main subspecies of charge, namely, the fixed charge and the floating 
charge.19 These transactional forms remain resolutely uncodified despite 
repeated attempts by reformers over the last fifty years to introduce a 
statutory personal property security regime into English law along the 
lines of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.20 Although the crea-
tion, attachment, and other fundamental attributes of these security in-
terests are governed by the common law, they are nevertheless affected 
by statute in various ways. So, for example, the perfection of fixed and 
                                                                                                                                      
 19. I am simplifying somewhat for purposes of the present discussion. For authoritative treat-
ment see ROYSTON MILES GOODE, GOODE ON COMMERCIAL LAW 630, 721–37 (Ewan McKendrick 
ed. 2009) (1982); LOUISE GULLIFER & JENNIFER PAYNE, CORPORATE FINANCE LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICY 236–61 (2011). On the functional similarities between English and American secured 
transactions law notwithstanding the U.K.’s lack of a codified system of personal property security 
interests, see Lynn M. LoPucki et al., Optimizing English and American Security Interests, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1785 (2013). In the same vein, and from an international and comparative perspective, 
see also U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS, at 46–49, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.12 (2010). 
 20. See generally THE REFORM OF UK PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY LAW: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES (John de Lacy ed., 2010). 
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floating security in respect of corporate debtors is governed by the statu-
tory registration regime set out in the Companies Act 2006.21 
Both forms of security interest evolved during the Victorian era on 
a trajectory that enabled lenders to take effective security over the future 
assets of their debtors.22 The fixed charge emerged as a species of security 
interest that enabled lenders to collateralize assets, such as a plant and 
equipment in a manufacturing business, that need to be replaced periodi-
cally.23 A fixed charge attaches to specific assets on its creation, but also 
attaches to the replacement assets when they are acquired, without the 
need for any further security instrument or further perfection.24 Moreo-
ver, a fixed charge over present and future property has priority from the 
date of its original creation.25 In other words, as regards future property, 
there is a “relation back” effect. When the debtor acquires the replace-
ment assets, the lender’s security interest in those assets is backdated to 
the date of the original grant.26 
The original genius of the floating charge from the perspective of 
lenders was that it expanded the reach of personal property security in-
terests beyond assets that we would characterize in accounting terms as 
“fixed assets” to circulating assets, notably inventory and receivables.27 In 
order to protect the lender’s collateral, a debtor is only permitted to dis-
pose of fixed charge assets with the lender’s consent.28 Unauthorized dis-
positions of collateral by the debtor will trigger default and acceleration 
provisions in the loan agreement and buyers who acquire collateral with 
notice of the charge will not take free and clear.29 
Once the courts had blessed the concept of a present security inter-
est over future property, a fixed charge over circulating assets became a 
theoretical possibility.30 But it made no practical sense to require a debtor 
to seek the lender’s consent every time the debtor wished to sell an item 
of inventory to a customer or to collect a receivable in order to improve 
cash flow.31 
The floating charge therefore emerged as a form of equitable securi-
ty interest that took the concept of a charge over present and future 
property to a new level. It increased the collateral available to lenders by 
enabling a lender to collateralize a constantly shifting fund of circulating 
assets. Yet, at the same time, it also allowed the debtor to dispose of the 
collateral freely in the ordinary course of the debtor’s business for so 
                                                                                                                                      
 21. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, pt. 25 (U.K.). 
 22. GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 19, at 237. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 237–38. 
 25. Id. at 238. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 243. 
 28. Id. at 242–43. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 243. 
 31. Id. 
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long as the debtor remained a going concern.32 The debtor can therefore 
liberate assets from the floating charge without the lender’s consent in 
the ordinary course of business.33 But, as soon as the debtor’s business 
ceases or the lender takes enforcement action in response to an event of 
default, the floating charge is said to “crystallize” on specific assets with-
in the fund of collateral at the relevant point in time.34 Metaphorically 
speaking, the floating charge “floats” or “hovers” over the collateral, but 
remains inchoate until crystallization. Conceptually speaking, at the mo-
ment of crystallization, the floating charge is converted into a fixed 
charge over the specific assets that are in the fund at that time, and the 
debtor’s power to dispose of those assets freely comes to an end.35 As the 
charge does not attach to specific assets until crystallization, other par-
ties—buyers, asset financiers, execution creditors, and the like—can gain 
priority over the lender in relation to floating charge assets.36 
In tandem, the consolidation of the fixed and floating charge con-
cepts during the Victorian era gave lenders the ability to collateralize the 
entire present and future assets of corporate debtors.37 A parallel devel-
opment was the emergence of the English version of what in the United 
States became known as “equity receivership.”38 As it was well-
established that a lender could reserve a right in the security instrument 
to appoint a receiver to take possession of and sell the collateral for the 
lender’s benefit, it made sense for lenders to insist on a package of secu-
rity consisting of fixed charges over “fixed” assets and a blanket floating 
charge over the debtor’s entire assets and undertaking.39 The breadth of 
available security, coupled with the power to appoint out of court what 
we now call an administrative receiver, offered lenders a high degree of 
priority and, in the context of a nascent corporate bankruptcy system,40 a 
large measure of control.41 
The floating charge has never been quite as robust as the fixed 
charge as a priority-conferring device. The interests of buyers and execu-
tion creditors can easily trump it because of its core design features: the 
debtor’s ability to liberate collateral from the ambit of the charge in the 
ordinary course of business and the inchoate nature of the charge prior 
to crystallization.42 Nevertheless, given the extensive reach of the floating 
                                                                                                                                      
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 243–49. 
 35. This at least is the prevailing theory in the case law. See, e.g., Evans v. Rival Granite Quarries 
Ltd., [1910] 2 K.B. 979, 999. For discussion of other theories, see GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 19, 
at 245–46. 
 36. See GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 19, at 272–78. 
 37. Id. at 237. 
 38. On equity receivership, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 56–69 (2001). 
 39. See GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 19, at 243–45, 272–73. 
 40. The first corporate bankruptcy provisions were enacted in the Companies Act, 1862, 25 & 26 
Vict., c. 89 (U.K.). ROY GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 12 (4th ed. 2011). 
 41. GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 19, at 272–78. 
 42. See, e.g., In re ELS Ltd. [1995] Ch 11. 
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charge, it originally had the potential to enhance the value of lenders’ 
priority rights where their debtors ceased trading and ended up in bank-
ruptcy.43 
B. Statutory Carve-Out Provisions: Origins and Expansion 
Preferential claims—in English legal parlance, a defined category, 
or defined categories, of unsecured claims that enjoy some form of statu-
torily created priority44—first acquired prominence with the enactment of 
the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act, 1888.45 This Act conferred 
a limited priority on unpaid employee wage claims (capped at twenty-
five pounds) and on unpaid assessed taxes and local rates that had fallen 
due within one year of the commencement of bankruptcy.46 Courts inter-
preted the 1888 provision to give preferential claims priority over general 
unsecured creditors in a distribution of unencumbered assets.47 As se-
cured creditors could by this time collateralize and potentially absorb all 
of a corporate debtor’s assets and undertaking, the statutory priority con-
ferred by the 1888 Act did not achieve its desired effect.48 
Parliament’s response was to enact the Preferential Payments in 
Bankruptcy Amendment Act, 1897.49 Section 2 of that Act contained our 
first bankruptcy carve-out provision. In circumstances where there were 
insufficient unencumbered assets to pay the 1888 Act’s categories of 
preferential claim in full, those claims were given priority over the claims 
of secured creditors under a floating charge and made payable out of 
floating charge collateral.50 
The main policy concern that animated the 1897 amendment was a 
familiar one. It was that overinclusive security led to uncompensated 
(and therefore unfair) wealth transfers from unsecured creditors, such as 
employees, who had contributed to the value of the collateral, only to 
have that value appropriated entirely by secured creditors.51 Wider calls 
to subordinate all fixed and floating charge collateral to preferential 
claims and to extend preferential status to trade creditors were resisted.52 
                                                                                                                                      
 43. GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 19, at 276. 
 44. The analogue in U.S. bankruptcy law is the categories of priority unsecured claims in 11 
U.S.C. § 507 (2012). 
 45. 51 & 52 Vict. c. 62 (U.K.). 
 46. See id. 
 47. Richards v. Overseers of Kidderminster, [1896] 2 Ch. 212. 
 48. See Buchler v. Talbot, [2004] 2 A.C. 298 at 305–06 (H.L.) (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead) 
(Eng.). 
 49. 60 & 61 Vict., c. 19 (U.K.). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See John Armour, Should We Redistribute in Insolvency?, in COMPANY CHARGES: 
SPECTRUM AND BEYOND 189, 195 (Joshua Getzler & Jennifer Payne eds., 2006). The justification for 
extending the carve-out to preferential tax claims under the 1888 Act will at this point in history have 
rested on ancient Crown prerogative. See Barbara K. Morgan, Should the Sovereign Be Paid First? A 
Comparative Analysis of the Priority for Tax Claims in Bankruptcy, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 461, 463 
(2000). 
 52. Armour, supra note 51, at 195. 
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There is some evidence that the 1897 amendment was followed by a 
relative decline in lender usage of the floating charge.53 While the impact 
on bank lending is hard to assess, the emergence of the closed corpora-
tion following the House of Lords decision in Aron Salomon v. A.  
Salomon and Company, Ltd.,54 together with the developments in se-
cured transactions law that I have already outlined, provided the envi-
ronment for a significant expansion in the availability of private credit, 
especially to small- and medium-sized enterprise, during the late-
Victorian and Edwardian eras.55 The best guess is that lenders initially 
rubbed along with the 1897 amendment. 
Over time, however, the 1897 carve-out expanded in scope. This 
came about in two ways. First, the categories of preferential claim gradu-
ally expanded in step with developments in tax law.56 Second, a 1970 de-
cision of the English Court of Appeal read the language of the carve-out 
as encompassing administrative expenses incurred in a liquidation bank-
ruptcy.57 Overnight, lenders faced the prospect that liquidators would be 
able to recoup all their administrative expenses and remuneration from 
floating charge collateral, and not merely the costs associated with the 
realization of that collateral. At this point, the lending community ap-
pears to have decided that enough was enough. 
C. Reaction and Counterreaction 
Lenders reacted to the cumulative developments outlined in the 
previous paragraph by innovating. It was well-established before the 
1970s that preferential claims arising in a corporate liquidation were not 
payable out of the lender’s collateral where the lender had appointed a 
receiver some time before the commencement of the liquidation.58 The 
reason was that the appointment of a receiver crystallized the floating 
charge and converted it into a fixed equitable charge over specific assets 
in the fund of collateral.59 It followed that any claims in the statutory cat-
egories that accrued due between the appointment of a receiver and the 
commencement of liquidation fell outside the carve-out on the logic that 
the statute only required preferential claims to be paid from assets that 
                                                                                                                                      
 53. Id. at 196–97 (identifying a decline in debt securities issuance backed by floating charges).  
 54. [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) (Eng.) (holding that it was open to a sole trader to incorporate and 
thereby enjoy the benefits of limited liability for business debts). 
 55. This was reflected in an expansion of the commercial banking sector. See MICHAEL COLLINS, 
MONEY AND BANKING IN THE UK: A HISTORY 34–118 (1988). However, the extent to which the float-
ing charge over circulating assets contributed directly to corporate expansion is contested. See Joshua 
Getzler, The Role of Security Over Future and Circulating Capital: Evidence from the British Economy 
circa 1850–1920, in COMPANY CHARGES, supra note 51, at 227–31. 
 56. For a useful summary, see Andrew Keay & Peter Walton, The Preferential Debts Regime in 
Liquidation Law: In the Public Interest?, 3 COMPANY FIN. & INSOLVENCY L. REV. 84 (1999). 
 57. See Mathias and Davies (A Firm) v. Down (In re Barleycorn Enterprises Ltd.) [1970] 1 Ch. 
465 at 470 (Eng.). 
 58. Joshua Tetley & Son, Ltd. v. Griffin Hotel Co., Ltd. (In re Griffin Hotel Co., Ltd.) [1941] 1 
Ch. 129 at 135 (Eng.). 
 59. See id. 
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were subject to a floating charge.60 As the charge had already ceased to 
float before the commencement of liquidation, the assets were subject to 
a fixed and not a floating charge.61 So the first thing lenders did to miti-
gate the effect of the carve-out was to adjust their prebankruptcy behav-
ior by appointing receivers as soon as there was any indication that their 
debtors might be heading for liquidation.62 
In response to the extension of the carve-out to administrative ex-
penses, lenders expanded the range of defined events in their standard 
loan documentation that would trigger automatic crystallization of the 
floating charge before the debtor entered bankruptcy and began to re-
serve the right to serve notice on the debtor converting the floating 
charge into a fixed charge at the first sign of financial trouble.63 Notwith-
standing the potential impact on preferential claimants, these transac-
tional innovations generally found favor with courts in England and in 
the Commonwealth on grounds of freedom of contract.64 Lenders could 
therefore use contract terms to accelerate crystallization in order to miti-
gate what, from their perspective, were the worst effects of the carve-out. 
It was widely understood that this kind of bilateral contractual ero-
sion of third-party statutory rights was vulnerable to policy objection and 
easy enough to outlaw.65 Parliament duly obliged in 1985 by reenacting 
the carve-out to make preferential claims payable out of “a charge which, 
as created, was a floating charge.”66 If the charge started life as a floating 
charge it was within the carve-out regardless of whether or not it had 
been converted, via crystallization, to a fixed charge before bankruptcy. 
But, even as one door was closing, lenders were already innovating in 
other more radical ways. 
                                                                                                                                      
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See, e.g., In re Christonette Int’l Ltd., [1982] 1 W.L.R. 1245 (Eng.). In Christonette, the lender 
appointed a receiver before the liquidation commenced and, in so doing, crystallized its floating 
charge. Id. at 1247. The court held that administrative expenses incurred by the liquidator during the 
course of the liquidation that would have been payable out of floating charge collateral under control-
ling precedent were not so payable because by the time the liquidation had commenced the charge was 
fixed not floating. Id. at 1250–52. 
 63. Id.at 1249. 
 64. See, e.g., In re Brightlife Ltd., [1987] 1 Ch. 200 at 214–15 (Eng.). 
 65. The Review Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Kenneth Cork the recommendations 
of which led to the enactment of the U.K. insolvency reforms of the mid-1980s was originally appoint-
ed in January 1977. The Committee’s positions on a range of matters affecting secured creditors were 
therefore well understood long before the publication of its final report in 1982. Perhaps the Cork 
Committee’s most radical proposal was that a secured creditor should be compelled to give up ten per 
cent of the value of its floating charge for distribution among unsecured creditors. This was balanced 
by a proposal to eliminate some categories of preferential claim and reduce the scope of others. The 
banks succeeded in blocking the proposal for a “Ten Percent Fund” but the inference is that they had 
to make some concessions. See CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note 7, 339–46; KENNETH CORK ET 
AL., INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE: REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE 344–51 (1982). 
 66. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 251 (U.K.). 
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D. The Rise and Decline of the Fixed Charge Over Receivables 
As the 1980s dawned, clearing bank lenders had already begun, in 
earnest, to expand the reach of the fixed charge to encompass circulating 
assets.67 Their motivation was straightforward: the more collateral that 
could be covered by fixed charges the better, because the statutory carve-
out had only ever applied to floating charges.68 Recall, however, that a 
core attribute of a fixed charge is that the debtor has no authority to deal 
with the collateral without the lender’s consent.69 Thus, for the same rea-
sons that the floating charge emerged in the first place, a fixed charge 
over circulating assets, such as inventory, would prove elusive. Neverthe-
less, for a quarter of a century between the late 1970s and 2005, lenders 
did succeed in extending fixed charge coverage to accounts receivable.70 
A typical modus operandi was as follows. The security instrument 
would be drafted to include a charge, expressly described as a “fixed” 
charge over book debts and other receivables.71 A further clause would 
be added expressly prohibiting the debtor from assigning its intangible 
property interest in the uncollected receivables and further requiring the 
debtor to pay the proceeds, once collected, into its account with the 
lender.72 The debtor would then usually be permitted to draw on the ac-
count as long as it kept within its existing overdraft limit.73 
This transactional device rested on the theory that the debtor could 
only deal with the receivables and their proceeds with the lender’s con-
sent.74 The theory was robust in so far as the debtor was prohibited from 
dealing with uncollected receivables without the lender’s affirmative con-
sent.75 But, as regards the proceeds, it rested on the flimsier notion that 
the lender “controlled” the debtor’s bank account and could always take 
steps to assert its lien, restrict the debtor’s reuse of proceeds, and so pro-
tect its collateral.76 
Nonclearing bank lenders that did not offer current account facili-
ties were initially less successful in avoiding the carve-out.77 They could 
easily restrict dealings with uncollected receivables, but a contractual 
stipulation that the debtor pay proceeds into a designated account main-
tained with a third-party clearing bank did not pass muster unless the 
debtor was blocked from drawing freely on the account.78 In the absence 
                                                                                                                                      
 67. Armour, supra note 51, at 198–99. 
 68. Although CORK ET AL., supra note 65, proposed a “Ten Percent Fund,” it did not propose to 
extend the carve-out to fixed charges. 
 69. GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 19, at 242–43. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See In re Brightlife Ltd., [1987] 1 Ch. 200 at 210 (Eng.) (explaining Siebe Gorman & Co. Ltd. 
v. Barclays Bank Ltd., [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 142 (Eng.)). 
 77. Id. at 209. 
 78. See id. 
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of effective controls on the designated account, the debtor would be free 
to collect its debts, liberate them from the charge, and then dispose of the 
proceeds without restriction.79 
However, in In re New Bullas Trading, Ltd.,80 the English Court of 
Appeal put nonclearing bank lenders on the same footing as their clear-
ing bank counterparts, by upholding as a fixed charge a security agree-
ment which required the debtor to pay the proceeds of receivables into a 
designated account held with a third-party bank, and further stipulated 
that the debtor was to deal with the proceeds in accordance with direc-
tions made in writing by the lender.81 The decision was controversial be-
cause the New Bullas “fixed” charge clearly contemplated that the debt-
or would be free to deal with the proceeds in the absence of a written 
direction from the lender.82 In other words, it was powered by a theory of 
negative consent. The security instrument required the debtor to pay 
what it collected into the designated account, but it was only if the lender 
gave no directions that the debtor was then permitted to use the pro-
ceeds.83 In practice, of course, lenders who used this arrangement never 
issued written directions, and so the debtor was free to collect the debts 
and recycle the proceeds as it pleased.84 The provision for written direc-
tions was nothing more than a drafting device designed to create the ap-
pearance of control over an account held by the debtor with a third-party 
bank that was outside the debtor-lender contractual nexus.85 
Clearing bank and nonclearing bank lenders thus managed to boost 
their priority by diverting receivables away from the statutory carve-out 
without excessively restricting the ability of borrowers to recycle their re-
ceivables into cash flow.86 Although the “fixed” charge over receivables 
rested on the fiction that the debtor’s ability to collect its debts and liber-
ate them from the charge was restricted or, to express it differently, that 
the lender enjoyed dominion over both the intangibles and their pro-
ceeds,87 the innovation held good for several years. One explanation for 
this is that English courts are prepared to treat questions of transactional 
                                                                                                                                      
 79. See id. 
 80. [1994] B.C.C. 36 (Eng.). 
 81. Id. at 38–39. 
 82. See Alan Berg, Charges over Book Debts: A Reply, 1995 J. BUS. L. 433, 449–63; Roy M. 
Goode, Charges over Book Debts: A Missed Opportunity, 110 L.Q. REV. 592, 596–603 (1994). 
 83. Berg, supra note 82, at 449–50. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. Nat’l Westminster Bank plc v. Spectrum Plus Ltd. (In re Spectrum Plus Ltd.), [2005] 2 A.C. 
680 at 718–19 (H.L.) (Lord Scott of Foscote); id. at 728–29 (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe) (Eng.). 
 87. In the English law of security over receivables, the extent of the debtor’s dominion over the 
collateral was relevant only to the question whether the lender’s charge was fixed or floating it being 
beyond doubt that a debtor could grant a floating charge over receivables that left it in total control of 
the collateral in the ordinary course of its business. LoPucki et al., supra note 19, at 1805. This con-
trasts, of course, with pre-U.C.C. law in the United States, under which the debtor’s freedom to con-
trol and dispose of receivables was apparently fatal to any kind of lien howsoever described. See Ben-
edict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925); Edward J. Janger, Brandeis, Progressivism, and Commercial Law: 
Rethinking Benedict v. Ratner, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 63, 66 (1998); G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy 
Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 3, 9 (2001). 
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characterization almost exclusively as questions of construction, and thus 
defer to the intention of the parties as discerned from the security in-
strument.88 At the same time, insolvency practitioners appointed as liqui-
dators were seemingly reluctant to challenge the fixed charge characteri-
zation on behalf of preferential claimants for fear of upsetting lenders.89 
There is some evidence that during the period from 1996 to 2003 U.K. 
banks were lending between three and four times as much on the security 
of receivables than they were on other circulating assets, such as invento-
ry.90 Whether this pattern of lending would have occurred had a judicially 
sanctioned fixed charge over this asset class been unavailable is open to 
doubt. Not surprisingly, the evidence also suggests that recoveries on 
preferential claims were consistently and persistently low.91 
What made the fixed charge over receivables so successful was the 
facility it gave lenders to work around the carve-out in a way that was 
commercially attractive from the ex ante standpoint of both lenders and 
borrowers. Lenders got priority without having to monitor the debtor 
closely.92 Borrowers were not denied access to liquidity, which made 
sense for lenders and borrowers alike.93 However, the commercial attrac-
tiveness of the fixed charge was significantly dampened by a decision of 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Agnew, a case on appeal 
from New Zealand,94 and a similarly reasoned decision of the House of 
                                                                                                                                      
 88. This is not to say that transactional form always triumphs over substance in English commer-
cial law. There are plenty of instances where English courts have recharacterized transactions because 
the rights granted by the agreement read as a whole were entirely at odds with the formal characteriza-
tion applied by the parties to describe their legal relationship. For example, in Street v. Mountford, 
[1985] A.C. 809, the House of Lords held that an agreement described as a real estate “license” but 
which, on its face, conferred exclusive possession of the premises on the “licensee” for a fixed period 
of time was, in truth, a lease. Id. In that case, Lord Templeman famously opined that ‘“[t]he manufac-
ture of a five-pronged implement for manual digging results in a fork even if the manufacturer, unfa-
miliar with the English language, insists that he intended to make and has made a spade.”’ Id. at 819. 
But the approach taken in Street v. Mountford is still one of pure construction and English courts are 
extremely reluctant in the absence of a finding that the parties acted dishonestly to rely on the post-
contractual conduct of the parties as an aid to defeating party intentions expressed in the contract it-
self. See GAVIN LIGHTMAN & GABRIEL MOSS, THE LAW OF ADMINISTRATORS AND RECEIVERS OF 
COMPANIES 47–51 (5th ed. 2011); Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne, The Characterization of Fixed and 
Floating Charges, in COMPANY CHARGES, supra note 51, at 69–73. Accordingly, it is unsurprising to an 
English lawyer that there was no sustained attempt in New Bullas to challenge the fixed charge charac-
terization on the basis that, posttransaction, the lender never in fact gave any directions, with the con-
sequence that the debtor was in reality always free to use the receivables proceeds as it pleased. 
 89. Insolvency practitioners who wished to be considered for potentially lucrative administrative 
receivership appointments needed to keep on the right side of the banks. See Gullifer & Payne, supra 
note 88. That said, in terms of the political economy of the fixed charge, there is a puzzle as to why 
Crown creditors were not more vigorous in fighting their corner. See id. In practice, virtually all the 
preferential claims during the era of the fixed charge over receivables were Crown claims, either for 
unpaid tax or, by way of subrogation, for employee claims that the government had met out of public 
funds. See id. 
 90. Sergei A. Davydenko & Julian R. Franks, Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A Study of Defaults 
in France, Germany, and the U.K., 63 J. FIN. 565, 587 (2008). 
 91. See Armour, supra note 51, at 200 (citing Julian Franks & Oren Sussmann, Financial Distress 
and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium Size UK Companies, 9 REV. FIN. 65, 83 (2005)). 
 92. See id. at 199. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Agnew v. Comm’r of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 A.C. 710 (P.C.) (appeal taken from N.Z.). 
WALTERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2015 2:05 PM 
No. 2] STATUTORY EROSION OF SECURED CREDITORS 557 
Lords in In re Spectrum Plus Ltd.,95 a test case that the banks felt com-
pelled to pursue in the light of Agnew.96 
In these cases, a new generation of senior Chancery judges exposed 
the Achilles Heel of the standard forms of fixed charge that had emerged 
in the previous quarter of a century. Their message was clear. The free-
dom of the debtor to dispose of receivables through collection and reuse 
of the proceeds was wholly inconsistent with the nature of a fixed charge. 
Clearing and nonclearing bank “fixed” charges were therefore recharac-
terized as floating charges and the collateral brought back within the 
scope of the carve-out.97 A fixed charge could only arise if the debtor’s 
access to the proceeds of receivables was blocked.98 Agnew and Spectrum 
left lenders who did not want to micro-manage their debtors’ day-to-day 
spending decisions with a simple choice: Either lend against the security 
of a floating charge over receivables and share the collateral with prefer-
ential creditors in bankruptcy or find another way.99 
E. The Modern Carve-Out and the Rise of Asset-Based Receivables 
Finance 
Although the Enterprise Act of 2002 abolished Crown preferential 
claims, the same legislation reconfigured the carve-out so as to assign a 
portion of floating charge collateral, known as the “prescribed part,” to 
the general unsecured creditors in a bankruptcy distribution.100 The un-
derlying policy goal was to redistribute realizations to unsecured credi-
tors as a whole that would previously have gone exclusively to the 
Crown.101 The rules for calculating the prescribed part are elaborate and 
                                                                                                                                      
 95. Nat’l Westminster Bank plc v. Spectrum Plus Ltd. (In re Spectrum Plus Ltd.), [2005] 2 A.C. 
680 (H.L.) (Eng.). 
 96. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council serves as the final court of appeal for the UK’s 
overseas territories and dependencies, and for some Commonwealth countries. Although Privy Coun-
cil decisions are apparently not binding on U.K. courts, they exert considerable influence over English 
law and practice because the core members of the Privy Council are all Justices of the U.K. Supreme 
Court. See generally Matthew D.J. Conaglen & Richard C. Nolan, Precedent from the Privy Council, 
122 L.Q. REV. 349 (2006). 
 97. See Spectrum Plus Ltd., [2005] 2 A.C. 680 at 722–25 (Lord Scott of Foscote). 
 98. Id. at 724 (Lord Scott of Foscote); id. at 730 (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe). 
 99. Armour, supra note 51, at 202–25. 
 100. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 176A(2)(a) (U.K.). The prescribed part requirement prima fa-
cie applies to distributions via a liquidation, administration, or administrative receivership. 
 101. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, INSOLVENCY—A SECOND CHANCE: THE 
INSOLVENCY SERVICE, 2001, CM 5234, ¶ 2.19 (U.K.). 
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it is subject to a £600,000 cap.102 Parliament also formally extended the 
carve-out to administrative expenses in a corporate liquidation.103 
There is, as of yet, no compelling empirical evidence to suggest that 
the modern carve-out has improved returns to the unsecured creditor 
constituency it is designed to benefit.104 Indeed, there are reasons to think 
that lenders have found effective ways to work around the Spectrum de-
cision, and so mitigate the effect of the carve-out by shifting away from 
overdraft lending secured by a charge over receivables in favor of asset-
based financing techniques such as invoice discounting.105 
In an invoice discounting arrangement, the debtor assigns its receiv-
ables to the lender in return for immediate financing, and then collects 
the receivables for the lender’s account.106 Although invoice discounting 
functions as a form of title-based security, the substitution of an outright 
assignment for a charge has the effect of taking the receivables outside of 
the carve-out.107 For the time being, it appears, once again, that lenders 
have managed to circumnavigate the carve-out, and reduce their costs of 
providing short-term cash flow finance to small-and medium-sized enter-
prises.108 Viewed in a wider context, the combination of the carve-out and 
the Spectrum decision appears to have accelerated a shift from relational 
(overdraft) lending to asset-based lending.109 
F. Some Provisional Conclusions About Carve-Outs 
The statutory carve-out has powerfully influenced English jurispru-
dence on the fixed and floating charge and, in turn, shaped the standard 
form transactional structures and legal technologies that lenders use. 
                                                                                                                                      
 102. The Insolvency Act 1986 (Prescribed Part) Order 2003, 2003, S.I. 2097, art. 3 (U.K.). Where 
floating charge collateral does not exceed £10,000, the prescribed part is fifty percent of the value of 
the collateral. Where floating charge collateral exceeds £10,000, the prescribed part is fifty percent of 
the first £10,000 and twenty percent of the excess. Case law has established that secured creditors can-
not participate in the prescribed part as regards any unsecured deficiency unless they surrender their 
security. See Horton v. Dawson (In re JT Frith Ltd.), [2012] B.C.C. 634 at 639 (Eng.); Thornily v. HM 
Revenue and Customs (In re Airbase (UK) Ltd.), [2008] 1 W.L.R. 1516 at 1521–22 (Eng.); In re  
Permacell Finesse Ltd., [2008] B.C.C. 208 at 211 (Eng.). 
 103. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 176ZA. Administrative expenses in an administration proceed-
ing are also payable out of floating charge collateral. 
 104. THE INSOLVENCY SERVICE, ENTERPRISE ACT 2002—CORPORATE INSOLVENCY PROVISIONS: 
EVALUATION REPORT 136–42 (2008); see also Louise Gullifer, The Reforms of the Enterprise Act 2002 
and the Floating Charge as a Security Device, in CURRENT ISSUES IN EUROPEAN FINANCIAL AND 
INSOLVENCY LAW: PERSPECTIVES FROM FRANCE AND THE UK 17, 28, 42–43 (Wolf-Georg Ringe et al. 
eds., 2009) (casting doubt based on the available evidence on whether the prescribed part will improve 
the position of unsecured creditors). 
 105. Armour, supra note 51, at 205. The annual reports of the Asset Finance Based Association 
(formerly the Factors and Discounters Association) chronicle the exponential growth over the last 
fifteen years in the volume of lending by bank-owned and independent asset based lenders under in-
voice discounting facilities. Annual Reports, ASSET BASED FIN. ASS’N., 
http://www.abfa.org.uk/members/annual-reports.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
 106. Armour, supra note 51, at 204. 
 107. Id. at 205. 
 108. Id. at 205. 
 109. Gullifer, supra note 104, at 42 n.156 (citing research which suggests that the trend away from 
overdraft lending towards asset-based lending had already begun by the mid 1990s). 
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Lenders have effectively conceded that the floating charge has limited 
value as a priority device, but continue to use so-called “lightweight” 
floating charges, emptied of meaningful collateral, for purposes of con-
trol.110 Where possible, they take fixed charges and, for assets where fixed 
charges are unavailable or unlikely to work in a commercially feasible 
manner, they have increasingly resorted to asset-based lending through 
specialist subsidiaries.111 
Throughout its history, the English carve-out has only ever applied 
to the floating charge.112 No attempt has been made to extend it to fixed 
charges or to other forms of functional security.113 This has left the way 
open for lenders to exploit first the fixed charge and, more recently, title-
based forms of security to escape its clutches.114 The fact that no such at-
tempt has been made indicates that it has not yet been thought politically 
feasible.115 Thus, while a comprehensive bankruptcy carve-out could be 
drafted that would be “adjustment proof” against transactional innova-
tion, it will either be resisted or diluted through metabargaining or ac-
commodated in other ways.116 
In the English context, it therefore makes political sense to stick 
with a fairly modest carve-out. But, as we have seen, a carve-out that ap-
plies to only one species of functional security is easy to avoid. A more 
far-reaching carve-out in terms of coverage117 would likely only be politi-
cally acceptable were its value to be capped at a modest level. The small-
er the cap, the greater the risk that any “carve-out” fund would be ab-
sorbed by the costs of administering and distributing it.118 The bigger the 
cap, the greater the likelihood that lenders would be even more aggres-
sive than they already are in managing and reducing their exposure pre-
bankruptcy through their “turnaround divisions” and “intensive care 
units.”119 In a policy climate reflective of political and economic concerns 
                                                                                                                                      
 110. Id. at 43; Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, The Floating Charge—An Elegy, in COMMERCIAL LAW 
AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE 479, 483–84 (Sarah Worthington ed., 2003). 
 111. See Mokal, supra note 110, at 480–81. 
 112. See John Armour, The Chequered History of the Floating Charge, 13 GRIFFITH L. REV. 25, 
33–35 (2004). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Gullifer, supra note 104, at 43; Mokal, supra note 110, at 483–84. 
 115. Parliament did debate whether to extend the carve-out to fixed charges in 1897 but conclud-
ed that it was too radical a step. See Armour, supra note 51, at 195.  
 116. See CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note 7, at 15. 
 117. For example, extended to all types of functional security or, more modestly, applied to func-
tional security, regardless of legal characterization, over specified types of collateral such as inventory 
or receivables. For discussion of a range of alternative “carve out” triggers none of them dependent on 
the fixed versus floating charge distinction see Gullifer & Payne, supra note 88, at 87–101.  
 118. The existing requirement to set aside the prescribed part can be disapplied if the insolvency 
practitioner thinks that the cost of making a distribution to unsecured creditors would be dispropor-
tionate to the benefit. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 176A(3)(b) (U.K.). 
 119. On the emergence of processes for informal management of distressed firms inside U.K. 
banks, see John Armour & Sandra Frisby, Rethinking Receivership, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 
91–95; Davydenko & Franks supra note 90, at 567; Franks & Sussman, supra note 91, at 84–93. For 
concern about the alleged recent practices orchestrated by one U.K. clearing bank through its turna-
round division see LAWRENCE TOMLINSON, BANKS’ LENDING PRACTICES: TREATMENT OF 
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about contraction in lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises,120 
the prospects for radical reform are, to my mind, remote. It should also 
not be forgotten that a “larger” carve-out would increase the exposure of 
business owners from whom lenders extract personal guarantees. The 
small business and banking lobbies would make common cause against 
such a proposal in defense of the U.K.’s “enterprise culture.”121 
It is an open question whether the English experience with statutory 
carve-outs can shed much light on concerns about overinclusive security 
interests in the United States. Of course, carve-outs have been debated 
extensively in the United States before in the context of proposals to re-
vise Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.122 I take no normative 
position in the “full versus partial” priority debate, but offer the modest 
suggestion that the English experience may give some credence to the 
arguments of those scholars and commentators on this side of the pond 
who doubt that a “partial priority” scheme in bankruptcy would deliver 
its intended benefits without unintended consequences. 
III. STATUTORY EROSION OF CONTROL RIGHTS 
A. The Law Prior to the Enterprise Act Reforms 
On paper, the Enterprise Act 2002 (“Enterprise Act”) weakened 
the control of secured creditors over the governance of financially dis-
tressed companies. Before the Enterprise Act, bankruptcy and secured 
transactions law were structured so as to confer significant formal control 
rights on secured creditors. We have seen already in Part II that English 
law permits secured creditors to collateralize all of the business and as-
sets of a corporate debtor through a combination of fixed and floating 
charges. Although, as we have also seen, the statutory carve-out had un-
dermined the blanket floating charge as a priority-conferring device long 
before the turn of the twenty-first century, it remained very useful as a 
control device. This was because a secured creditor holding a blanket 
floating charge covering the whole, or substantially the whole, of the 
debtor company’s assets could freely contract for the right to appoint a 
licensed insolvency practitioner as an administrative receiver,123 and 
could make such an appointment swiftly without the need for an applica-
                                                                                                                                      
BUSINESSES IN DISTRESS 10–12 (2013), available at http://tomlinsonreport.com/docs/tomlinson 
Report.pdf. 
 120. See, e.g., ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., FINANCING SMES & ENTREPRENEURS 2013: 
AN OECD SCOREBOARD 27–39 (2013).  
 121. On the origins and development of the ‘enterprise culture’ in U.K. public discourse, see  
Patricia Carr & Graham Beaver, The Enterprise Culture: Understanding a Misunderstood Concept, 11 
STRATEGIC CHANGE 105 passim (2002). 
 122. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to the Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279 (1997); 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bank-
ruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (1996). 
 123. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, §§ 29(2), 388(1)(a). In the text hereafter, I abbreviate “adminis-
trative receiver” and “administrative receivership” to “receiver” and “receivership” respectively. 
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tion to the court, or for any kind of showing that the debtor was formally 
insolvent.124 The right to appoint a receiver could be triggered merely by 
the debtor’s breach of covenants in the loan agreement.125 
Other structural features of the pre-Enterprise Act law further en-
hanced the attractiveness of receivership to lenders as a method for en-
forcing their security. A receiver could be given full plenary powers to 
manage the debtor and realize its assets.126 Although a receiver was 
deemed to be the agent of the debtor,127 rather than of the appointing 
creditor, his main function was to enforce the security and maximize the 
appointing creditor’s recoveries. Accordingly, it was well-established that 
a receiver’s duties to anyone other than the appointing creditor were 
very limited.128 So, for example, a receiver was free to determine the tim-
ing of asset realizations without regard to likely changes in market condi-
tions. He was under a duty (enforceable by a subsequently appointed 
liquidator on behalf of unsecured creditors) to procure the best price for 
assets available in the market at the time he decided to sell.129 But, he 
owed no duty to maximize asset values over and above what was neces-
sary to repay the appointing creditor and preferential claims falling with-
in the scope of the statutory carve-out. Thus, even if he could have taken 
steps to increase asset values, for example, by delaying a sale in anticipa-
tion of a rising market, he was not obliged even to consider, let alone 
take, those steps.130 Prima facie, receivers had little or no meaningful ac-
countability to junior creditors. Furthermore, under pre-Enterprise Act 
law, secured creditors who were entitled to appoint a receiver had the 
statutory right to veto the debtor’s entry into administration, English 
bankruptcy law’s main formal collective “rescue” procedure.131 The struc-
tural hegemony of secured creditors over the realization of distressed 
firms’ assets was about as absolute as it could be. 
B. Policy Objections to Secured Creditors’ Formal Control Rights 
Under Pre-Enterprise Act Law 
The main policy objections to the formal legal framework for the 
enforcement of secured creditors’ rights as it stood before the Enterprise 
Act were that it created value destructive perverse incentives and ren-
dered a receiver insufficiently accountable to junior creditors.132 First, it 
                                                                                                                                      
 124. Prentice, supra note 13, at 156–57. 
 125. See GOODE, supra note 40, at 333–34; LIGHTMAN & MOSS, supra note 88, at 212–13.  
 126. LIGHTMAN & MOSS, supra note 88, at 26–27. 
 127. Id. at 28; Armour & Frisby, supra note 119, at 76–78. 
 128. LIGHTMAN & MOSS, supra note 88, at 28, 381–82, 384–92. 
 129. Cuckmere Brick Co. v. Mut. Fin. Ltd [1971] 1 Ch. 949 (Eng.). 
 130. Silven Props. Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Scot. [2004] 1 W.L.R. 997 at 1005 (Eng.); Bell v. Long 
[2008] EWHC (Ch) 1273, [14] (Eng.). 
 131. See infra Section III.B. 
 132. See, for example, John Armour, Audrey Hsu, & Adrian Walters, Corporate Insolvency in the 
United Kingdom: The Impact of the Enterprise Act 2002, 5 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 148, 158–59 
(2008) and literature therein cited. For a U.S. perspective on this incentive problem see also Jay  
Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795, 844–52 (2004). 
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was said that the law had a built-in liquidation bias. If secured creditors, 
generously endowed with the comprehensive package of collateral that 
the English law of consensual security permits, were fully or oversecured 
on the break-up value of the assets, they had every incentive to close 
down and prematurely liquidate potentially viable firms that might have 
considerable going-concern value. In a similar vein, it was said that re-
ceivers had no incentives to maximize realizations because of the highly 
circumscribed nature of their legal duties to junior creditors.133 A further 
claim was that lenders and receivers lacked the correct incentives to min-
imize their enforcement costs in cases where unsecured creditors, but for 
those costs, might be in the money.134 The conventional wisdom that took 
root among policymakers was that the ability of secured creditors, 
through receivership, to control their exit without formal regard to the 
interests of other constituencies was inefficient, unfair, and wasteful.135 
After the Labour Party’s landslide victory in the 1997 general elec-
tion, the Blair government heeded this conventional wisdom, and reform 
of receivership became one strand of Labour’s extensive modernization 
agenda.136 A government White Paper, Productivity and Enterprise: In-
solvency—A Second Chance, published in July 2001, echoed the concerns 
about administrative receivership outlined in the previous paragraph.137 It 
was widely perceived that Labour’s political aim was to “punish” the 
banks for their role in the economic recession of the early 1990s. As the 
White Paper put it: “There was also widespread concern that the large 
number of administrative receivership appointments in the early 1990s 
may have represented precipitate behaviour on the part of lenders, caus-
ing companies to fail unnecessarily.”138 
C. The Formal Weakening of Secured Creditor Control by the 
Enterprise Act 
The Enterprise Act reconfigured corporate bankruptcy law in two 
complementary ways. First, it prospectively abolished receivership “in all 
but a handful of exceptional” financing scenarios.139 Second, it elevated 
the collective administration procedure to a position of much greater 
structural prominence within bankruptcy and secured transactions law 
than it had hitherto enjoyed.140 In order to explain these formal changes 
in the structure of English law fully, I need to say something first about 
administration. 
                                                                                                                                      
 133. Armour, Hsu, & Walters, supra note 132, at 159 n.41. 
 134. Id. at 158. 
 135. See id. at 161. 
 136. On Labour’s modernization program generally, see JANET NEWMAN, MODERNIZING 
GOVERNANCE: NEW LABOUR, POLICY AND SOCIETY (2001).  
 137. INSOLVENCY—A SECOND CHANCE: THE INSOLVENCY SERVICE, supra note 101, at 2.1–2.3. 
 138. Id. at 2.1. 
 139. Armour, Hsu & Walters, supra note 132, at 160. 
 140. Id. 
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Administration was a product of the U.K.’s bankruptcy law reforms 
of the 1980s. In its first incarnation, administration could only be com-
menced by court order.141 It provided debtors with a comprehensive stay, 
together with a statutory “breathing spell” in which to formulate, and 
seek creditor approval of, proposals for business continuation.142 Ironical-
ly enough, administration was originally conceived as a mechanism for 
extending the perceived benefits of receivership to debtors who had not 
granted blanket floating charges,143 especially the facility that receiver-
ship provided for quick going-concern sales.144 
A point sometimes lost sight of in comparative discourse is that ad-
ministration, in and of itself, has never been a reorganization procedure 
akin to a classic Chapter 11 in which creditors’ claims are substituted by 
rights under a confirmed plan. It has always functioned principally as a 
procedure designed to facilitate a better (i.e., a going-concern) realiza-
tion of business assets than could be achieved through a piecemeal liqui-
dation.145 Although it is now possible for an administrator to distribute 
proceeds of a business sale without first having to convert an administra-
tion to a liquidation,146 there is no facility for a debtor to seek and obtain 
confirmation of a binding restructuring plan unless an administration is 
combined with another formal procedure.147 Thus, to accomplish some-
thing approximating a Chapter 11 reorganization, an administrator will 
need to procure the debtor’s exit from administration into a separate vot-
ing procedure that allows debts to be restructured in accordance with the 
wishes of a majority of the creditors, such as a company voluntary ar-
rangement,148 or a Companies Act scheme of arrangement.149 
There were two main differences between administration and re-
ceivership that the architects of the Enterprise Act reforms sought to ex-
ploit. First, administration was (and remains) a collective proceeding, 
with the consequence that the administrator has a duty to act in the in-
terests of creditors as a whole.150 So, while a receiver was entitled to pri-
oritize the interests of his appointing creditor, and this entitlement con-
strained his fiduciary obligations to other constituencies, an 
administrator has always had a higher duty to maximize the realizable 
                                                                                                                                      
 141. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, §§ 9–27, repealed by Enterprise Act, 2002, c.40 (Eng.). 
 142. Id. § 11(3), repealed by Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40 (Eng.). 
 143. CORK ET AL., supra note 65, at 117–22. 
 144. Armour & Frisby, supra note 119, at 86–91. Administrators, like receivers, have wide powers 
to manage the assets they control including powers to carry on and sell the debtor’s business. See In-
solvency Act, 1986, c. 45, sched. 1 (U.K.) (repealed 2009). 
 145. See SANDRA FRISBY, REPORT ON INSOLVENCY OUTCOMES 57–61 (2006), available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegi
slation/research/corpdocs/InsolvencyOutcomes.pdf; Sandra Frisby, In Search of a Rescue Regime: The 
Enterprise Act 2002, 67 MOD. L. REV. 247, 249–50 (2004). 
 146. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, sched. B1, ¶¶ 65–66. 
 147. Armour, Hsu & Walters, supra note 132, at 154. 
 148. Insolvency Act, 1986, pt. 1. 
 149. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 895–901 (Eng.). 
 150. INSOLVENCY—A SECOND CHANCE: THE INSOLVENCY SERVICE, supra note 101, at ¶ C.23. 
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value of the debtor’s assets and business.151 Second, an administrator (in 
stark contrast to a receiver) must submit his proposals for dealing with 
the debtor’s business to a creditors’ meeting and seek creditor approv-
al.152 Administration offered unsecured creditors a bundle of formal 
rights. But before the Enterprise Act it had been used relatively infre-
quently,153 not least because secured creditors had the statutory right to 
block the appointment of an administrator so that they could appoint a 
receiver instead.154 
The aim of the Enterprise Act reforms was to curtail the power of 
secured creditors to appoint receivers,155 and to increase usage of admin-
istration by channelling debtors who would otherwise have been candi-
dates for receivership into a substantially remodelled version of the ad-
ministration procedure.156 The underlying policy goal was to improve net 
outcomes for unsecured creditors by maximizing asset realizations and 
reducing costs.157 Policymakers thought that the greater accountability of 
an administrator would address the perverse incentive problem associat-
ed with receivership, and thereby increase asset realizations, and that 
various “streamlining” changes to the administration procedure, includ-
ing provision for out-of-court entry routes, would make administration 
less costly.158 
At first blush, the reforms seemed radical. In truth, however, lend-
ers appear to have accepted that the writing was on the wall for receiver-
ship,159 and to have devoted most of their energy into making the post-
Enterprise Act administration procedure as “bank friendly” as they pos-
sibly could.160 The government made several concessions during the re-
form process. The statutory retraction of the power to appoint a receiver 
only applied prospectively to floating charges created on or after Sep-
tember 15, 2003, the date the legislation came into effect.161 Secured cred-
itors holding “grandfathered” security created before that date could 
(and can still) appoint a receiver as before, should they be so inclined.162 
                                                                                                                                      
 151. See, e.g., In re Charnley Davies Ltd., [1990] B.C.C. 605 at 618 (Eng.). 
 152. See Insolvency Act, 1986, c.45, sched. B1, ¶¶ 49–55. 
 153. INSOLVENCY—A SECOND CHANCE: THE INSOLVENCY SERVICE, supra note 101, at ¶ 2.1. 
 154. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 72(1). 
 156. Id. § 8, sched. B1. 
 157. INSOLVENCY—A SECOND CHANCE: THE INSOLVENCY SERVICE, supra note 101, at ¶ 2.1–
2.18. 
 158. Id. at ¶¶ 2.3, 2.8, 2.12. 
 159. See, e.g., Alan Katz & Michael Mumford, Comparative Study of Administration and Adminis-
trative Receivership as Business Rescue Vehicles (Executive Summary) 5–13 (Lancaster Univ. Mgmt. 
Sch. Working Paper 2003/097, Aug. 2003), available at http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/48696/1/Document.pdf 
(finding that lenders were already beginning to make the switch from receivership to administration 
before the Enterprise Act changes became effective). 
 160. As a consequence, some have argued that the Enterprise Act changed very little even on a 
formal basis. See, e.g., Robert Stevens, Security after the Enterprise Act, in COMPANY CHARGES, supra 
note 51, at 153.  
 161. Id. at 154. 
 162. JOHN ARMOUR, AUDREY HSU & ADRIAN WALTERS, THE IMPACT OF THE ENTERPRISE ACT 
OF 2002 ON REALISATIONS AND COSTS IN CORPORATE RESCUE PROCEEDINGS 16 (2006), available at 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/242155506_The_Impact_of_the_Enterprise_Act_2002_on_Re
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The prohibition on the appointment of a receiver is also subject to a lim-
ited number of exceptions designed to protect investors in a narrow 
range of exotic, high value lending transactions, such as capital market 
arrangements, involving sums of at least £50 million, and various types of 
project and infrastructure financing.163 
More significantly, the new out-of-court entry routes were config-
ured so as to give the holder of a “qualifying floating charge”164 a power 
to appoint an administrator165 and a power to veto the choice of adminis-
trator in cases where the debtor or its directors make the appointment.166 
Secured creditors may have lost their right to appoint a receiver under 
post-Enterprise Act security, but they still formally control the selection 
and appointment of the licensed insolvency practitioners who act as ad-
ministrators.167 Lenders had already managed to adapt to the impending 
new reality through metabargaining within the political process.168 
D. New Forms of Control: Post-Enterprise Act Practice 
The formal position after the Enterprise Act can be summarized 
thus. The scope for secured creditors to enforce their security without 
paying due regard to junior creditors has been reduced, and the govern-
ance rights of unsecured creditors have been correspondingly increased 
through the reform of the administration procedure.169 There is no ques-
tion that, as a formal matter, an administrator is much more widely ac-
countable than a receiver. He must perform his functions with a view to 
achieving a hierarchy of objectives: first, to rescue the company as a go-
ing concern; failing that, to achieve a better result for the creditors as a 
whole than would be likely in liquidation; and, failing that, to realize col-
lateral in order to make a distribution to secured and preferential credi-
tors.170 Thus, in stark contrast to a receiver, an administrator is statutorily 
obliged to prioritize a value maximizing “rescue”—either of the company 
or the business—if he thinks it is reasonably practicable to do so.171 The 
formal commitment to value maximization is further reinforced by the 
administrator’s express statutory duty to perform his functions in the in-
                                                                                                                                      
alisations_and_Costs_in_Corporate_Rescue_Proceedings_A_Report_Prepared_for_the_Insolvency_ 
Service_by. 
 163. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, §§ 72B–72GA (U.K.). 
 164. Defined as a floating charge which relates to the whole or substantially the whole of the 
company’s property. Id. at sched. B1, ¶ 14(3). 
 165. Id. at sched. B1, ¶ 14(1), (2). 
 166. Id. at sched. B1, ¶¶ 26(1), 36. 
 167. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONERS: A 
MARKET STUDY 30–35 (2010), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/ 
http:/www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Insolvency/oft1245.  
 168. Vanessa Finch, Re-invigorating Corporate Rescue, 2003 J. BUS. L. 527, 534–35. 
 169. Armour, Hsu, & Walters, supra note 132, at 151. 
 170. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, sched. B1, ¶ 3(1). 
 171. Id. at sched. B1, ¶¶ 3(3), (4). English courts are traditionally deferential to the business 
judgments made by regulated professionals such as licensed insolvency practitioners. This is reflected 
in the statutory language, which defers in several instances to what the administrator “thinks.” See 
LIGHTMAN & MOSS, supra note 88, at 341–45, 349–51. 
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terests of the debtor’s creditors as a whole.172 In addition, there are sever-
al other mechanisms that confer control rights on unsecured creditors.173 
But, as practice since the Enterprise Act bears out, the fact that we 
choose to give unsecured creditors enhanced statutory control rights 
does not guarantee that they will use them. 
Lenders quickly adapted to the new law using their remaining for-
mal control rights over the selection and appointment of the administra-
tor to reassert their economic power in new ways.174 Administration be-
came the procedure of choice, even in cases where lenders could still 
have appointed receivers under “grandfathered” security, accelerating a 
trend that had already begun before the Act became effective.175 The 
most plausible explanation for this is that lenders have chosen to distance 
themselves from the adverse public perception of receivership as a 
mechanism through which banks close down good businesses.176 
For similar public relations reasons, it is comparatively rare for 
lenders to exercise their statutory power to appoint an administrator.177 
Lenders prefer instead to “invite” their customers to appoint an adminis-
trator that they (the lenders) nominate from a preselected “panel” of 
their preferred appointees.178 The large-and medium-sized accountancy 
firms, whose insolvency practitioners had been the “go to guys” for re-
ceivership appointments, populate these bank panels.179 
The degree of control that lenders have over the market for admin-
istration appointments, and the way in which they exercise that control to 
allocate work among the charmed circle of insolvency practitioners on 
their panels, has attracted regulatory scrutiny arising from antitrust con-
cerns.180 So, while the Enterprise Act may have disrupted the formal con-
trol rights of secured creditors, the processes and networks that the main 
lenders had previously used to originate receivership appointments in 
                                                                                                                                      
 172. Id. sched. B1, ¶ 3(2). In cases where the administrator is simply realizing collateral to make a 
distribution to secured or preferential creditors under § 3(1)(c), the duty to act in the interests of credi-
tors as a whole is relaxed and substituted by a duty not to cause unnecessary harm to the interests of 
creditors as a whole. See id. at sched. B1, ¶ 3(4)(b). An administrator will only consider pursuing this 
alternative where he concludes that the secured creditor is hopelessly under-secured and there is no 
prospect of a return to unsecured creditors. 
 173. Id. at sched. B1, ¶¶ 51–53 (requirement for unsecured creditor approval of the administra-
tor’s proposals unless the administrator concludes that unsecured creditors will be out of the money); 
id. at sched. B1, ¶¶ 74–75 (statutory rights to challenge the administrator’s conduct while in office and 
hold him to account that are directly enforceable by unsecured creditors). 
 174. THE INSOLVENCY SERVICE, supra note 104, at 14. 
 175. Id. at 16–23, 126–30. 
 176. Id. at 129. 
 177. Id. at 129. 
 178. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 167, at 30–35. 
 179. Id. at 32–35. 
 180. The Office of Fair Trading’s market study was a product of these concerns. The OFT’s prin-
cipal findings were that the market for administration appointments operates reasonably competitively 
notwithstanding the existence of bank panels, but that unsecured creditors suffer harm in cases where 
the primary lender is fully or over-secured because unsecured creditors are far less effective than the 
lender at controlling the level of costs and fees incurred by insolvency practitioners. See id. at 3–9. 
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cases of any size181 have been substantially replicated within the current 
legal framework. 
Meanwhile, the preponderance of the available evidence suggests 
that the stronger formal rights conferred on unsecured creditors by the 
Enterprise Act have proved to be functionally weak.182 Indeed, if any-
thing, the evidence indicates that secured creditor control serves unse-
cured creditors passably well in cases where lenders are under-secured.183 
Insolvency practitioners on bank panels have good legal, commercial, 
and reputational incentives to pursue strategies that will maximize value, 
and lenders appear to do a good job of controlling costs by leveraging 
their relationships with “panel” practitioners to negotiate discounted fees 
in return for the prospect of future work.184 
The impression is different where the bank is fully or oversecured. 
In these cases, the evidence suggests that once the primary lender is out 
of the picture, costs increase, and returns to creditors correspondingly 
diminish.185 The standard explanation for this is that unsecured creditors 
are for the most part “one shot” players who are weakly coordinated and 
rationally apathetic.186 In other words, they suffer from collective action 
problems, and, accordingly, do not exploit the (quasi-private) formal 
control mechanisms available to them in the legislation.187 It appears that, 
as a consequence, insolvency practitioners can charge their standard 
rates in the “fully/over-secured” cases without any effective market or 
legal control.188 Banks benefit from fee discounts. Unsecured creditors 
who are in the money do not.189 
In practice then, the Enterprise Act reforms have done little to dis-
rupt secured creditors’ functional control of distressed firms.190 Having 
metabargained for continuing control rights over the appointment of 
administrators, the main lenders have seamlessly adapted their existing 
processes and professional networks to the new legal regime: a case of 
                                                                                                                                      
 181. Id. at 32 (suggesting that banks generally use panels to select insolvency practitioners in cases 
where their exposure exceeds £200,000). 
 182. Id. at 43. 
 183. Id. at 41. 
 184. Id. at 37–41.  
 185. See John Armour, Audrey Hsu, & Adrian Walters, The Costs and Benefits of Secured Credi-
tor Control in Bankruptcy: Evidence from the U.K., 8 REV. L. & ECON. 101, 108–11 (2012) (reporting 
on an empirical study the findings of which were subsequently validated in further work by the OFFICE 
OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 167, at 41–66). The basis on which practitioners charge fees is a matter 
for creditor rather than court approval in the first instance, although there are formal mechanisms in 
the Insolvency Act 1986 through which court scrutiny can be triggered. See A Creditors’ Guide to Ad-
ministrators’ Fees, INST. CHARTERED ACCTS ENG. & WALES, http://www.icaew.com/~/media/ 
Files/Technical/Insolvency/creditors-guides/creditors-guide-to-administrators-fees-england-and-wales-
apr-10.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2014). 
 186. See Armour, Hsu, & Walters, supra note 185, at 111. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See id.; see also OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 167, at 41–66 (validating findings of 
journal article with further empirical evidence). 
 189. See Armour, Hsu & Walters, supra note 185, at 111. 
 190. Id. at 132. 
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“old wine in new bottles.”191 The main change in the landscape has been 
the rise of asset-based finance alongside more traditional forms of bank 
lending, with the result that there are now more varieties of secured fi-
nance and greater fragmentation.192 This change in financing patterns 
raises the potential for costly conflicts for control among secured credi-
tors that are unlikely to do much good for the constituents whose inter-
ests the Enterprise Act reforms were designed to promote. In the mean-
time, in the light of the evidence that unsecured creditors’ formal control 
rights are functionally weak, the attention of policymakers has turned to 
the regulation of insolvency practitioners and their fees.193 The search is 
on for a workable proxy that could represent the interests of unsecured 
creditors and coordinate the exercise of their existing control rights more 
effectively.194 
E. Prepacks 
The persistence of lenders’ functional control over distressed firms 
in the post-Enterprise Act era, coupled with the facility that administra-
tion provides for swift going-concern business sales, has accelerated oth-
er changes in market practice.195 One such change—the rise in the use of 
prepackaged administrations or “prepacks” as they are more commonly 
known—has provoked fierce debate.196 
“Prepacks” provide lenders with a quick and controlled exit. The 
sale of the distressed firm is negotiated in advance and then completed 
                                                                                                                                      
 191. See Sandra Frisby, The Effect of the Enterprise Act 2002: Empirical Research into Corporate 
Insolvency, in CURRENT ISSUES, supra note 104, at 59. 
 192. FRISBY, supra note 145, 9–10, 33–35; OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 167, at 40–41. 
 193. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 178, at 37–39. See generally ELAINE KEMPSON, 
REVIEW OF INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONER FEES: REPORT TO THE INSOLVENCY SERVICE (2013), availa-
ble at http://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-library/sites/geography/migrated/documents/pfrc1316.pdf; THE 
INSOLVENCY SERVICE, STRENGTHENING THE REGULATORY REGIME AND FEE STRUCTURE FOR 
INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONERS (2014), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/280880/Strengthening_the_regulatory_regime_and_fee_structure_for 
_insolvency_practitioners.pdf. 
 194. The government would like Crown creditors to be more proactive on behalf of their fellow 
unsecured creditors. THE INSOLVENCY SERVICE, supra note 193, at 25. There is a puzzle over why 
Crown creditors, as repeat players, have not been more effective in exercising unsecured creditors’ 
control rights to this point. It appears that, of late, some of this has to do with budgetary constraints. 
See KEMPSON, supra note 193, at 45. Another partial explanation might be that Crown creditors ex-
pend most of their available resources on other upstream collection strategies, including the use of 
involuntary bankruptcy. See, e.g., Jason Kilborn & Adrian Walters, Involuntary Bankruptcy as Debt 
Collection: Multi-Jurisdictional Lessons in Choosing the Right Tool for the Job, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
123, 149–53 (2013). 
 195. See, e.g., Frisby, supra note 191, at 60 (describing how the use of pre-packs has sharply in-
creased after the introduction of the Enterprise Act). 
 196. See, e.g., Kate Creighton-Selvay, Pre-Packed Administrations: An Empirical Social Rights 
Analysis, 42 INDUS. L.J. 85 (2013); Vanessa Finch, Corporate Rescue: Who is Interested?, 2012 J. BUS. 
L. 190; Vanessa Finch, Pre-Packaged Administrations: Bargains in the Shadow of Insolvency or Shad-
owy Bargains?, 2006 J. BUS. L. 568; Sandra Frisby, Insolvency Law and Insolvency Practice: Principles 
and Pragmatism Diverge?, 64 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 349 (2011); Peter Walton, Pre-Packaged Ad-
ministrations—Trick or Treat, 19 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 113 (2006); Peter Walton, Pre-Packin’ 
in the UK, 18 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 85 (2009); Bo Xie, Regulating Pre-Packaged Administration: A 
Complete Agenda?, 2011 J. BUS. L. 513. 
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quickly by the lender’s chosen insolvency practitioner within the shelter 
of the administration procedure.197 The standard justification for pre-
packs is that a quick, planned sale, implemented through a short lived 
formal proceeding, may be essential if value is to be preserved in a “melt-
ing ice cube” scenario.198 Indeed, English bankruptcy law has generously 
accommodated emergency asset sales for many years on exactly this ra-
tionale.199 The upshot is that the administrator can consummate a pre-
pack sale under his statutory powers without first seeking creditor ap-
proval as long as he thinks that the sale will produce a better outcome for 
creditors than a liquidation.200 Unsecured creditors, presented with a fait 
accompli may, of course, challenge the administrator’s conduct as a 
breach of duty ex post.201 But, as we have seen, unsecured creditors are 
not known for exercising the statutory rights at their disposal. 
The litany of criticisms leveled at prepacks echo earlier criticisms of 
receivership. The critics worry that prepacks lack transparency, disen-
franchise unsecured creditors, give rise to potential conflicts of interest 
for lender-nominated insolvency practitioners, are not properly market 
tested, and therefore lead to sales that undervalue the business.202 These 
worries are exacerbated by the fact that the majority of prepacks result in 
sales to connected parties.203 The empirical reality is difficult to gauge204 
and proponents argue that prepacks do the best job possible of realizing 
value in less than propitious circumstances.205 What is clear is that, not-
withstanding the administrator’s duty to perform his functions in the col-
lective interests of creditors as a whole, secured creditors are able to use 
prepacks as a means of dictating the method and timing of asset realiza-
tion, much in the same way that they previously used receivership. In 
other words, prepacks are little more than a functional substitute for re-
ceivership sales. Not surprisingly, as modern adaptations of old practices 
                                                                                                                                      
 197. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 167, at 23. 
 198. See generally David A. Skeel, Competing Narratives in Corporate Bankruptcy: Debtor in 
Control vs. No Time to Spare, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1187. 
 199. See, e.g., In re T&D Indus. PLC, [1999] 1 W.L.R. 646 at 657 (Eng.); In re Transbus Int’l Ltd., 
[2004] 1 W.L.R. 2654 at 2656 (Eng.); DKLL Solicitors v. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, [2007] 
B.C.C. 908 (Eng.); In re Kayley Vending Ltd, [2009] B.C.C. 578 (Eng.); In re Hellas Telecomms. (Lux.) 
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and processes have emerged, familiar concerns that unsecured creditors 
are being short changed have resurfaced in new guises.206 
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
In sum, my Article tells two related stories of lenders adjusting to 
statutory erosion of their rights. In both cases, the relevant statutory pro-
visions were tempered by concessions to lenders that made them reason-
ably amenable to adjustment. The United Kingdom has a legal culture 
that strongly privileges contract and property rights. Accordingly, a stat-
utory carve-out that has only ever applied to the floating charge has 
proved highly susceptible to transactional innovation. The Enterprise 
Act left lenders firmly in control of administration appointments, and 
this has enabled them to reproduce old practices and processes within 
the interstices of a legal regime that ostensibly weakens their formal con-
trol rights. 
Whether we can meaningfully generalize from the U.K. experience 
and extract useful lessons for U.S. bankruptcy law reformers is an open 
question. But I venture this: It is likely that for reasons of political expe-
diency any reform package will have to be “balanced.” And, once lend-
ers have metabargained their way to a “balanced” set of reforms, the 
U.K. experience indicates, perhaps not surprisingly, that they are able to 
work around them quickly. 
This is not to say that we should give up. For example, if it is true 
(as seems plausible) that section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code provides 
secured creditors with a nationwide federal foreclosure mechanism that 
is vastly superior to state-by-state foreclosure under nonbankruptcy 
law,207 perhaps secured creditors could be persuaded to give up just a lit-
tle of the upside on the argument that the benefits would still exceed the 
costs. But, we should proceed with our eyes wide open. 
The next round of U.K. bankruptcy law reforms will likely be re-
forms designed to further bolster the regulation of insolvency practition-
ers.208 That U.K. policymakers are now concentrating on how to devise 
more effective mechanisms for curbing professional fees and for enforc-
ing the existing legal duties of administrators, especially in relation to 
prepacks, appears to be a tacit admission that prior attempts to use bank-
ruptcy law to improve the position of unsecured creditors by dampening 
the rights of secured creditors were little more than a failed conceit. 
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